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My subject is what Western countries must do if it is to develop on a wide 
scale the prospering and flourishing that are at the heart of the Good Life and 
thus central to the Good Economy. 
In the West, nations have been suffering for a long time from a familiar set 
of symptoms: meager rates of return to investment, national wage levels and 
national income both growing at a snail's pace, reduced job satisfaction 
especially among the young, high wealth-wage ratios weakening incentives to 
work and save, pathological public debt levels in most countries, and (in some 
countries) a considerable rise in working-age people unwilling or unable to 
participate in the labor force. Some writers speak of “the end of “capitalism. 
What are the causes? Some economists, notably my friend Lawrence 
Summers, speak of “secular stagnation,” echoing the term coined by the 
Keynesian Alvin Hansen in the Great Depression to suggest that “effective 
demand” is depressive; and another economist, Ben Bernanke, speaks of a 
“global saving glut,” thus a deficiency of “effective demand,” as Keynes 
called it. But, although “demand” has not been really strong over the long 
“stagnation,” it has not been weak enough to produce the telltale signs of 
deflation or disinflation. 
*Edmund Phelps, the 2006 Nobel laureate in economics, is director of the Center on Capitalism 




In my view, the immediate cause of the stagnation in the West is the 
mentioned. The boom underway in America and Europe can be expected to 
boost productivity levels on the upswing, though it may well erase such 
cyclical gains on the way down. However, booms are not an augury of faster 
long-term growth. 
The underlying cause of the productivity slowdowns in these economies, 
broadly speaking, is the net losses of aggregate indigenous innovation – losses 
net of gains brought by the digital revolution and other sources. The net losses 
were most severe in the US, UK and France. These losses alone were enough 
to slow the growth of productivity throughout the Western economies. It is 
striking that Germany lost most of its impressive indigenous innovation 
(President Roosevelt at one time worried that Germany would overtake 
America) in the late 1930s, and it has still not got much of it back, though it 
has found success as a “trading nation.” It is also striking that Italy, which had 
a high rate of “imported” innovation during the catch-up years of the '50s and 
'60s, had only began building up significant “indigenous” innovation around 
1980; then it lost nearly all of that innovation by 1995 or so. These findings 
derive from estimates by a research team at the Center on Capitalism and 
Society.
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1 The estimation procedure underpinning this sketch was developed and carried out by Raicho 
Bojilov, a member of the research team. 
2 See Chapter 14 of Gianni Toniolo, ed. The Italian Economy since Unification (Oxford 




The concern that many of us attach to these findings on Italy may seem 
puzzling to some. After all, levels of average wage rates and productivity – 
labor productivity, capital productivity and so-called total factor productivity – 
especially among older people, are still pretty high in Italy, thanks to Italy's 
achievement at importing new methods and products conceived and pioneered 
abroad. But most of us would not be satisfied with an economy in a stationary 
state. Many people in the West would find it disquieting to be told that 
innovation in the West will be limited to whatever will be achieved by the 
monopolists of Silicon Valley. 
So what is the significance of these net losses of innovation? In the view of 
some economists, such as my friend Joseph Stiglitz, the main significance of 
the losses of innovation – in Italy, France, Britain and America – is mainly 
that participants in the labor force have felt deprived by the slowdown in the 
growth of wages. But how many centuries of wage growth does a country 
need to have until people have enough? Frank Ramsey and John Maynard 
Keynes thought in 1928 that people would be satiated with consumption and 
leisure within several decades. The clamor for wage growth is beginning to 
ring false, at least to my ears. 
The main significance of what we are witnessing, as I see it, is that the 
losses of innovation, especially the indigenous kind, have deprived many 
participants of individualistic rewards, which go much deeper than 
“collective” rewards like earning the general wage rate and buying at the 
general price level or enjoying the security of a fiefdom. Let me explain. 
To begin, we humans are not machines. What is most precious to us is our 





This was what the 19th century was all about. A new way of life was 
spreading: going one's own way, taking one's chances, seizing one's 
opportunities. Novelist Charles Dickens depicted and historian Emma Griffin 
documented the emergence of a new society in which people increasingly took 
control of their lives - many of them having careers they could not have 
foreseen.
3
 (Dickens himself led an enterprising, audacious life.) The historian 
Paul Johnson, documenting the beginning of this phenomenon, dubbed it the 
"birth of the modern" - modern life in a modern economy.4 
Modernistic satisfactions are individualistic, not “collective” I see three 
kinds of rewards of that sort. First, one may take satisfaction in achieving 
something through one's own efforts and may find satisfaction from the better 
terms or greater recognition that might result. 
These rewards are experiential and may have a creative aspect. They are 
about “succeeding,” or, to use a narrower term, prospering (from the Latin pro 
spere, meaning as hoped, according to expectation). Successes come in many 
forms: an office worker winning a raise in recognition of her unusual 
achievement in her job, a craftsman seeing his hard-earned mastery result in a 
better product, a merchant's satisfaction at seeing “his ship come in,” or a 
scholar's sense of validation from being awarded an honorary degree. 
Second, a person may find satisfaction from the unfolding of his or her life 
in rewarding ways: the thrill of voyaging into the unknown, the excitement of 
the challenges, the gratification of overcoming obstacles and the fascination 
3 Griffin finds evidence of the new attitudes in her recent book Liberty's Dawn (Yale, 2013). 
Her more recent focus on 19th century materials can be expected to be even more revealing. 
One worker, after being promoted to the position of riveter, exclaimed how gratifying it was to 
be able to use his "creativity." 
4  Paul Johnson, The Birth of the Modern (HarperCollins, 1991). 
5 
 
with the uncertainties. Emerson wrote that "a life is a journey, not a 
destination." 
Last, but not least, there is the satisfaction of “acting on the world” (in 
Hegel's term) and, with luck, “making a mark,” perhaps changing the world – 
“making a dent,” as the Beatles put it. It seems to me that these last two kinds 
of satisfactions are what is meant by the term flourishing. 
Is there any evidence to support my claim that a large loss of indigenous 
innovation in a country causes employed people a serious loss of human 
satisfaction? My book Mass Flourishing – coming out in Italian, I’m happy to 
report – points to evidence drawn from the World Values Surveys.
5
 It shows 
that in 1990-91 the mean level of reported job satisfaction was very low in the 
countries suffering low levels of indigenous innovation – Italy and France, for 
example– and relatively high in countries with relatively high indigenous 
innovation - notably Switzerland, Denmark and America. Now the same 
research team has extracted evidence from 2008 data in the European Values 
Surveys.
6
 It shows that, among 13 economically advanced western European 
countries, those ranking lowest in reporting “high” or “somewhat high” job 
satisfaction– Spain, France and Italy – ranked very low in indigenous 
innovation as well (9th,  11th  and 13th respectively) and those ranking highest in 
job satisfaction –Switzerland and Denmark –  ranked very high in indigenous  
innovation (in 2nd  place and 4th place, respectively). 
What was the source – the wellspring – of the indigenous innovation that, in 
several countries, brought the satisfactions I call prospering and flourishing? And 
what has been causing the losses of this innovation? 
5 
 The data are from the World Values Survey. See Mass Flourishing (Princeton, Princeton 
University  Press, 2013), pages 196 and 197. 
6
  Data in the European Values Surveys are usually found in World Values Surveys but not in 




I have maintained for years that the source was the rise of the modernism that 
sprung up in southern Europe in Renaissance times. One could argue that the 
modernist influence began with the great scholar Pico della Mirandola.
7 
He openly 
argued that mankind possesses creativity. The voice of some other figures stirred 
people to use their creativity – the ambition of Cellini, the individualism of Luther, 
the vitalism of Cervantes and the personal growth of Montaigne and, later, the 
need for imagination in Hume and the acceptance of the unknown in Kierkegaard. 
Some 19th century philosophers, such as Charles Peirce, William James, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and Henri Bergson embraced uncertainty and relished the new. 
In my book I also maintain that innovation was also pervasive – in all or 
most industries –and inclusive – from the grassroots of society on up. Much, 
perhaps most, of the contribution of innovation to economic growth can be laid 
to the new ideas of ordinary people engaged in ordinary business life. The 
work they did every day led them to conceive of possibly better methods in 
farms, factories and offices – though they must have been aware that 
commercial success was uncertain. Pico would have understood this. 
You may be wondering:  Is there evidence to back the thesis that the desire to 
innovate is fueled by values? Yes there is, thanks to some ingenious research: A 
statistical analysis by the same research team of data from a cross-section of 18 
countries in the OECD shows that the countries with higher economic 
performance (as measured by job satisfaction and labor force participation rates) 
tend to have higher levels of the right values or lower values of the wrong ones. 
See the Figure appended.
8
  
7  I am told that at Oxford as late as the 17th century Aristotle was known as the Philosopher, since 
he had appeared to have thought through so much of what was to be understood, and Pico was 
known as the Scholar, because he knew everything that was known in his time. 
8 The statistical procedure behind this chart employs a method created by Harold Hotelling and 
was carried out by Gylfi Zoega, a member of the research team. 
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Accordingly, I maintain – regarding the present day – that the serious 
deficiency of indigenous innovation in one country after another in western 
Europe and North America has come not from an absence of profitable 
possibilities and not from any omissions of the public sector (like bridges and 
tunnels not built) but from a decline of the modern values that sparked the desire to 
innovate.9 
Economists missed this. They were either Schumpeterians believing that the 
innovations we observe were obvious applications by an experienced entrepreneur 
of a scientist's discovery, or they were Hayekians believing that what we really 
observe are merely the "adaptations" that result when unseen and evolving 
opportunities are intuited by an insightful businessman."
10
 
What has happened in the realm of values that may account for the 
weakness of indigenous innovation in Italy and Britain, in France and in 
America? When we think of the momentous innovations in those countries it 
is almost unimaginable that modern values have been lost or opposed. 
How about vitalism? Do we still score high on that? I am not convinced. I 
wonder whether Americans are still do-ers. Do they love to compete as much 
as in the decades from, say, the 1850s up to the mid- 1960s, say? Or are they 
still the couch-potatoes, that was once said about them? Are they fixed on all 
the tweets coming in by the hour? 
It appears to me that in the present age – since the war – there is a dread of 
“Knightian” uncertainty (named after Frank Knight11 – Keynes also introduced  
9 This is a critical thesis of my book Mass Flourishing (Princeton University Press, 2013). 
10 See Joseph Schumpeter's 1912 landmark Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung and, 
Friedrich Hayek's widely known article, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," reprinted in his 
essays,  Individualism  and Economic Order (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948). 




the concept.)12 The Pope just commented on this. People came to be 
uncomfortable with the directionlessness that modernist values injected into 
the economy. The loss of their former fascination with voyaging into the 
unknown – which is an element of expressionism – is one of the causes of the 
serious loss of dynamism, thus a serious loss of innovation. (I did not say 
disappearance of innovation, only a serious loss of it.) 
The flagrant short-termism of corporate heads and our representatives in 
legislatures – witness the tax cuts proposed in Washington – is another 
hypothesis. Answering a query from Larry Summers, I looked into what has 
happened to the steepness of the yield curve since the earliest period to recent 
periods. The trend has been up. In the period 1925-32, the average 10-year rate 
was only 0.05 points above the average 3-month rate. In the period 1994-96 it 
was 1.93, in 2003-2005 and in 2016-17 it was 1.51.13 These observations are 
consistent with the hypothesis that asset managers and clients are more averse 
to long-term assets, with their relatively high element of uncertainty, than they 
were in the span of normal years in the Interwar period. However, the 
hypothesized rise of short-termism is not outside my framework of modernist 
values. It looks to me like a loss of vitalism. 
I also sense there has also been a decline of individualism in the West. 
Where are the Horatio Alger stories? Where are the young people asking the 
Horace Greeleys in what direction to go? I am shocked that young Americans 
report in opinion surveys that they want to remain in their home town, live 
 
12 John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability (Macmillan & Co., 1921). 
13 Thomas S. Coleman, Lawrence Fisher, and Roger G. Ibbotson, Historical US. Treasury 
Yield Curves (New York: Moody  Investor's  Services,  1993); For later data see the 
"Resource Center" of the U.S. Department of the Treasury's website. 
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close to their friends or even continue to live at home!14 This is a portrait of 
America that is almost unrecognizable to me. Certainly it is not the nation that 
Norman Rockwell painted and Willa Cather wrote about. 
There are other hypotheses, most of them a reversion to the tenets of 
corporatism, about which I will say more a little later. There is the rise of the 
“money culture,” as John Dewey called it. There is also the strange and 
perverse love affair of most Americans and Europeans (including Brits) with 
houses – Rome and New York are rare exceptions – which is another kind of 
materialism. 
There is more than a deficiency of modern values behind the decline of 
innovating. Society has come to subscribe to some antithetical values, which 
may interfere with modern values. A new set of values arose under the name of 
corporatism in the 1890s – in Germany, France and Italy –and put into 
practice in the Interwar period. The essence of this doctrine is that the society 
is a coordinated “body” (corpore), so companies ought not to do what would 
harm the state and may be obliged to act for the good of society, is antithetical 
to individualism. A would-be innovator might well be looked at as selfish and, 
to the extent he or she succeeds, disruptive and thus anti-social. 
In recent decades, neo-corporatism sees it as an obligation of society to 
extend social protection to various groups and to ensure that all groups 
advance in lockstep. Neo-corporatism also sees it as acceptable that companies 
protect themselves from competition from others. Call it self-protection. This 
has led to an unprecedented acceptance of monopoly power. 
 
14  See Brad Tuttle, "Being 30 and Living With Your Parents Isn't Lame - It's Awesome," Time 




The emergence of abusive use of patents and protectionist regulations are 
other examples. I would only make the point that an economy needs some 
basic patent protection and some basic regulations, but a forest of regulation 
and patents makes it burdensome for individuals to start new companies and 
presents legal hazards to employees and managers inside existing companies 
who would haves liked to try out new methods or policies. Why has society 
allowed these governmental abuses to arise? In part, my answer is that, much 
of the citizenry have lost their allegiance to modernist values. 
Finally, politicians have taken ad hoc measures that directly block 
competition from new ideas. The entry of startup firms is impeded through a 
variety of actions–from tariffs and quotas to outright aid to incumbents–to 
save established companies from losing market share. Furthermore, when 
incumbents become safe from firms with new ideas, they can afford to cut 
back whatever defensive innovation they might have done. All this represents 
a serious rejection of individualism in favor of collective action. 
So we are faced with significant alienation from the modern values–the 
necessary individualism, vitalism and expressionism– that drove massive 
innovation in the lead economies of the West. And we are faced with a rise of 
post-modern values that celebrate every non-profit enterprise more than any 
commercial one. To regain the dynamism of old we need to return to those 
modernist values and reject the post-modern ones. 
 I want to wish all the students here lives of creating, exploring, discovering 























y = 0.9508x - 7.071 












5.5 6.5 7.5 8.5 9.5 10.5 11.5
































































Sources: The World Values Survey (2008-2009), Heritage Foundation (2008) 
Authors: Zoega et al. 
Assorted Human Values,  2008 - 2009 





































Notes: The procedure gives each country a score on its values – some positive values, 
some negative. The procedure also gives each country a score on its performance data. 
The chart shows the estimated correlation between scores on performance and scores on 
values. 
